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THROUGH A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
FILTER: FEAR AND PRETEXTUALITY IN
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
Deborah A. Dorfnan *
I. Introduction
I work as a patients' rights advocate, representing the
expressed interests of the mentally disabled at commitment and
capacity hearings.' Often, when I tell people what I do, they
commonly respond: "What do you want to do that for? They should
all be kept locked away," "Isn't that dangerous?" or "Aren't you
afraid you'll get hurt?" While these reactions frustrate me, they
never surprise me, as they illustrate longstanding feelings of hostility,
fear, and trepidation towards the mentally ill.2 This apprehension
pervades all aspects of society; not even those proponents of our legal
system who so often profess fairness, due process, and justice are
immune from these feelings.'
One result of our feelings towards the mentally disabled is
that the regulation of involuntary commitment power has developed
0 Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
" Patients' Rights/Housing Advocate at the Mental Health Advocacy Project in San
Jose, CA; B.A. 1987, University of California at Berkeley; M.A. 1989, New York
University; J.D. 1992, New York Law School. I wish to thank my husband, Stephen
Cohn, and my parents, Penny and Gerald Dorfman, for their ongoing enthusiasm and
support. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Perlin for his helpful comments
and encouragement.
I In California, "capacity hearings" are held to determine whether a person was
subject to civil commitment has the capacity to refuse prescribed antipsychotic
medication. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5332-33 (West Supp. 1993).
2 See John Monahan, "A Terror to Their Neighbors": Beliefs About Mental Disorder
and Violence in Historical and Cultural Perspective, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
191, 192-93 (1992) (people associate the mentally ill with violence).
' See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 394-97 (1992)
(discussing common societal myths held by the public and actors in the legal system
regarding the mentally disabled, including the myth that they are dangerous and
frightening).
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into a combination of parens patriae and police power. Specifically,
we often justify our decisions to involuntarily commit a person or
impose medication based on both the best interest of the individual
and public safety concerns. 4 However, this treatment and the
motivation for it are often pretextual, as the best interest and safety
justifications can mask the significant influence that fear has in
decisions to involuntarily commit and forcibly medicate mentally
disabled patients. Our failure to acknowledge the pretextuality in
mental disability jurisprudence and in our individual behavior often
forces antitherapeutic treatment on mentally disabled persons,
thwarting good faith efforts to provide legitimate treatment.
This article addresses, from a therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective, the influences which determine the treatment we give to
the mentally disabled and how these influences affect the patient.
Specifically, this article asserts that, as a result of fear,
misunderstanding, and hatred of the mentally ill, the treatment
provided to them by the legal system's "players"' is pretextual, and
therefore antitherapeutic." First, this article addresses the reasons for
pretextuality by examining our fears of the mentally disabled.
4 Although the phrase "best interest" is no longer prevalent in all state statutes, the
law in practice tends to take a best interest posture. Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 9.29 (McKinney 1988) (involuntary admission on medical certification) with Savastano
v. Nurnberg, 584 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (App. Div. 1989) ("A transfer is authorized when
it is determined to be in the best interests of the patient."). Additionally, there are still
a number of states that allow the government to involuntarily commit patients based on
parens patriae power. JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE
ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES,
26 (1992); see R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform
on Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L.
45, 46 (1988) (examining the impact of legislative reform of the criteria for civil
commitment, particularly statutes revised with the intent to increase or decrease the use
of individual hospitalization).
S The "players" include: judges, lawyers (prosecutors and defense attorneys), and
mental health workers (staff and doctors).
6 Therapeutic jurisprudence examines legal decision making to determine whether
it is therapeutic for the person. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 17 (1993);
David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992). See generally THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990)
[hereinafter LAW AS AOENT] (a collection of essays on therapeutic jurisprudence).
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Second, this article discusses the many forms of pretextuality in
treating individuals with mental disabilities. That section will focus
on the interrelationship between involuntary civil commitment and
psychiatric medication. The final section of this article explores the
interplay between our anxieties regarding the mentally ill and the
treatment we provide them. Specifically, this last section examines
how our disparagement of the mentally disabled inhibits good faith
efforts to provide therapeutic treatment to them by substituting
pretextual treatments which are not beneficial to the patient.
II. Fear and Pretextuality
While there are different reasons proffered for providing
pretextual treatment to the mentally ill,7 including political and public
pressures, a major underlying factor is fear.' Historically, people
have feared and misunderstood the mentally disabled. In ancient
times they were associated with the devil.' During the middle ages,
they were perceived as witches. 10 Today this fear is manifest
throughout society, including the legal system, as people frequently
continue to view the mentally ill with consternation.1
Our fear of the mentally disabled is expressed in different
ways, including the ways we prescribe, advocate, and order treatment
for them. The involuntary treatment given to the mentally disabled,
while generally veiled in good intentions, is, to a great extent,
' Pretextuality in this context refers to legal decision makers, and the legal system
as a whole, accepting biased or dishonest psychiatric testimony in cases involving mental
disability issues. See Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social
Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAVIORAL
Sci. & L. 47, 50 (1993).
1 These apprehensions can also be explained by what Professor Michael L. Perlin
calls "sanist" attitudes. Perlin, supra note 3, at 374. "Sanism" is the irrational prejudice
and bias that permeates our legal system, particularly in the area of mental disability
law. Id.
' See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology ofInsanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 626 (1989-90).
'0 Herschel Prins, Attitudes Towards the Mentally Disordered, 182 MED. So. & L.
181, 183 (1984).
11 Perlin, supra note 3, at 398.
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pretextual because it is often prescribed for the wrong reasons and
has a significant negative impact on the treatment's therapeutic
value. 12
In order to understand and identify this pretextual treatment,
it is necessary to understand why we feel threatened by the mentally
ill. Much of the anxiety we feel towards those with mental
disabilities stems from our belief that they are dangerous." We
manifest these fears in different ways. On one level, we often
presume that all mentally disabled individuals are dangerous by virtue
of their mentally ill status, regardless of their actual condition and
despite the fact that few of them are actually dangerous.1" Our fears
are manifested through political pressure on legislators, particularly
at the state and local levels, narrowing the legal rights of the mentally
ill.1" The effects of this pressure can be seen in a number of states'
12 See Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, The Impact of Expanding a State's
Commitment Authority, in LAW As AGENT, supra note 6, at 125 [hereinafter Durham
& LaFond, Impact] (increasing coercive involuntary civil commitment will not further
therapeutic justice). Studies have shown that although some treatment for the mentally
ill is better than none, not all treatment is effective, particularly for those who are being
treated as non-dangerous inpatients. See Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, A Search
for the Missing Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of
the Mentally III, in LAW As AoNr, supra note 6, at 162 [hereinafter Durham &
LaFond, Missing Premise].
13 But see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and
Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 519 (1992) (finding a "modest link" between
mental illness and dangerousness). I recognize some individuals with mental disabilities
are actually or potentially violent. However, I am arguing that often the mentally
disabled are perceived as dangerous merely because they have a mental illness and
despite the fact that they are not contemporaneously having psychotic symptoms.
Professor Monahan points out that the link between mental illness and violence only
applies to those presently experiencing symptoms. "Being a former patient in a mental
hospital-that is, having experienced psychotic symptoms in the past-bears no direct
relationship to violence." Id. at 519.
"' See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983) (upholding a statutory
scheme that places the burden on an insanity acquitee to prove that he is no longer
mentally ill or dangerous, and concluding that a presumption that the patient is still
mentally ill is reasonable).
's An example is the abolition of the insanity defense in the Michigan and its
replacement in 1975 with the "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict as a result of a
state court decision that prohibited the automatic commitment of criminal defendants
found not guilty by reason of insanity. 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 15.09 (3d ed. 1989).
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recent legislation curtailing the release of involuntarily committed
individuals as well as enhancing the parenspatriae and police powers
to commit people. 6 For example, Washington has broadened its
commitment statutes to include a wider scope of people who are
subject to involuntary civil commitment. 7 Similarly, the California
Senate is currently considering a bill which adds homelessness" to
the code section defining "gravely disabled."1 9
This political pressure extends not only to state legislatures
but also to courts. Courts are construing release conditions more
narrowly, making it increasingly difficult to obtain release.20 Courts
do this by focusing on potential dangerousness in deciding whether
to release a patient from involuntary commitment.21 For example,
when courts consider the release of forensic mental health patients,
6 See Durham & LaFond, Impact, supra note 12, at 121; see also CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5008.2 (West Supp. 1993) (allowing the presentation of a history of
mental illness to determine whether or not a person is gravely disabled or a danger to
themselves or others for the purposes of involuntary civil commitment).
17 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(1)(b) (West 1991) (defining gravely
disabled as a "condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, .. .
manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning; evidenced by repeated and
escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not
receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety."); see also Durham &
LaFond, Impact, supra note 12, at 121, 124 (There "is increasing pressure today to
expand the scope of [Washington] state's therapeutic commitment authority." This has
"led to calls for changing civil commitment laws to make it easier to hospitalize the
mentally ill for treatment." However, the authors' research has provided evidence "that
increasing the coercive power of the state for a therapeutic purpose will not further
therapeutic justice.").
'8 See CAL. S.B. 791, Reg. Sess. at § 5008(n) (California 1993).
'9 In California, "gravely disabled" is defined as "a condition in which a person, as
a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic needs for food,
clothing or shelter." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(A) (West 1992).
' See id.; In re Barnard, 616 N.E.2d 714, 729 (1993) ("[Clommitment will be
upheld where there is a reasonable expectation that respondent will engage in dangerous
conduct."); see also Bagby & Atkinson, supra note 4, at 59 ("'[There is still lingering
Uudiciall deference to psychiatric recommendation, commitment without evidence of
facts of dangerousness and a passive or nonadversary counsel.'" (quoting V.A. Hiday,
Sociology of Mental Health Law, 67 Soc. & Soc. RES. 111, 114 (1983))).
21 Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 7, at 55.
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they often decide either to extend the amount of time of commitment22
or require participation in restrictive outpatient programs.?3  In
California, under certain circumstances, a forensic mental health
patient can be detained beyond the duration of the original sentence
if the person is considered a mentally disordered offender (MDO). u
MDOs are prisoners who: (i) suffer from a severe disorder that is not
in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; (ii)
have a severe mental disorder which was one of the causes or an
aggravating factor in the commission of the crime; (iii) have been in
treatment for the severe mental disorder for ninety days or more
within the last year prior to the parole release date; (iv) have been
sentenced for a crime involving force or violence; and, (v) because
of the severe mental disorder, represent a substantial danger of
physical harm to others.25
Fear of the mentally ill can be explained in part by our dread
of becoming mentally ill ourselves. It is not just the belief that the
mentally ill are violently dangerous that causes such anxiety. We
also fear the mentally ill because they make us fear ourselves.26 We
feel threatened because we see some part of ourselves in them.
" See LAFoND & DURHAM, supra note 4, at 159 ("Treatment has also been used as
a subterfuge to ensure lifetime incarceration of offenders who have served their full
prison terms and, after having fully paid their debt to society, are entitled to release.").
2 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1600-1620 (West Supp. 1993) (an example of a
restrictive outpatient commitment program for offenders found incompetent to stand trial,
not guilty by reason of insanity, or mentally disordered).
24 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-81 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); see also Gregory B.
Leong, et al., Dangerous Menially Disordered Criminals: Unresolvable Societal Fear?,
36 J. FORENsIC Sd. 210, 214-16 (1991) (discussing California's Mentally Disordered
Offender statute as a form of social control).
25 CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962 (West Supp. 1993).
1 Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 7, at 48; see Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv.
63, 108 (1991) (discussing society's fears of mentally disabled persons); id. at 93 n. 174
("While race and sex are immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both.
Perhaps this illuminates the level of virulence we experience here.").
27 ROY PORTER, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADNESS: THE WORLD THROUGH THE EYES
OF THE INSANE 4-5 (1987).
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This phenomenon is, in large part, a result of a conflict
between our fear of loss of love28 and our need to be deviant.29
Deviance is natural. ° We all have a desire to be deviant while at the
same time we have an overwhelming need to be loved or, in other
words, accepted into society. 1 We perceive the mentally ill as deviant
because they do not conform to the type of behavior expected in our
society. 2 This difference is threatening to us because, in some ways,
we are all deviant, even if our deviant behavior and deviant desires are
secret." Yet we are afraid that if we are viewed as nonconforming
or different, we will be outcast and even despised,34 or worse-that we
will be deemed or diagnosed mentally ill." Thus, we block any
deviant or socially unacceptable feelings and actions so as not to
violate any cultural taboos. 6
These fears of the mentally ill and mental illness have the
potential for interfering in treatment decisions by those involved in
the decision-making process, including doctors, hearing officers or
judges, and attorneys. When these decisions are predominately a
result of our fears, rather than based on the evidence presented, they
I See generally JoHN BOWBLY, 2 ATTACHMENT & Loss 383 (1973) (Freud's later
work contends that "anxiety is the reaction to the danger of loss of object.").
29 DAVID MATZA, BECOMING DEVIANT 13-14 (1969).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Amnon Carmi, The Abnormal Approach to Abnormality, in PSYCHIATRY-LAW
AND ETMIcs 3, 9 (A. Carmi et al. eds., 1986); see also MicHEL FOUCAULT, MENTAL
ILLNESS AND PSYCHOLOGY 79 (1976) ("In the West, there is a high level of intolerance,
in that the social group ... is incapable of integrating or even of accepting the deviant
person; hospitalization.. . is immediately demanded.").
33 ERIc FROMM, THE SANE SocIETY 24 (1955).
3' Carmi, supra note 32, at 9. Deviance, although not easily or universally defined,
"constitutes a threat to the sacred traditions and to common conceptions. Deviance is
in and of itself a frustration to members of the 'normals' and causes reactions. These
reactions are to define society and attack deviants." Id.
11 See id. When an individual's actions or behavior seem so deviant from the
"norm," society labels them "crazy" and treats them as a deviant. Id.
3 ERIc FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 204 (1969). The foregoing explanation
is offered based on a psychoanalytic theory, although there are other schools of thought
that may offer alternative explanations for our behavior. However, this explanation is
most consistent with the theory that our fears of the mentally ill cause us to make
pretextually based antitherapeutic decisions regarding involuntary civil commitment and
forced medication.
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become pretextual and potentially antitherapeutic. The next section
of this article explores how this pretextual treatment, both in the
forms of involuntary civil commitment and involuntary medication,
manifests itself throughout mental disability law jurisprudence.
111. Manifestations of Pretextual Treatment in the Legal Context
In order to grapple with our phobia of becoming mentally ill,
we often use pretextual decisions in treating the mentally disabled.
The pretextuality involved in decisions is expressed in different ways
and often masks the true justification that to involuntarily commit or
medicate is in the patient's best interest or that the person, if not
treated, may be dangerous. This section addresses how pretextuality
manifests itself in the decisions to civilly commit and medicate the
mentally disabled.
A. Involuntary Commitment
Fear of the mentally disabled plays a significant role in
pretextual decisions to involuntarily commit mental patients.
Involuntary commitment usually involves a court order to hospitalize
an individual whom the state believes is unable to care for himself or
is a danger to himself or others. Such commitment is often justified
as being in the best interests of the patient." However, these
decisions are often pretextual because hospitalization is neither
appropriate for the patient in all instances nor is it what the patient
wants. Unfortunately, it is often what the individual decision maker
and society want."8
3' See generally State v. Evjen, 826 P.2d 92, 92 (Or. 1992) (affirming a civil
commitment order that appellant was unable to provide for basic personal needs and
was not receiving such care as was necessary for public health and safety).
M' See State v. Westcott, 597 A.2d 1072 (N.H. 1991); Herbert A. Eastman,
Metaphor and Madness, Law and Liberty, 40 DEPAuL L. REv. 281, 343 (1991)
(psychiatrists make decisions about patient care based on the needs of the patient); see
also Mark S. Kaufman, "Crazy' Until Proven Innocent? Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 333, 363 (1987-88) (medical
professionals commit the mentally ill and the homeless because of the fears of the
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Pretextual decision-making is also reflected by the practices
of mental health and legal professionals who advocate or order
needless or excessive commitment.39 Overcommitment is often a
result of numerous factors, including the fear that psychiatrists will
be held morally and legally accountable by the public for deciding to
release a person rather than commit them.' Excessively long
commitments are problematic because studies show that individuals
who are committed for a year or less tend to fare better and actually
benefit from treatment provided during their commitment period in
comparison to those who are committed in excess of one year.4
Despite this fact, courts, mental health professionals, and other
players in the legal system, often resist patients' attempt to obtain
release.42  This is accomplished by recommending continued
commitment based on the possibility that these individuals will
become either "gravely disabled"43 or dangerous to themselves or
others sometime in the future, although they are not presently in such
a condition."
Related to the problems of overcommitment and excessive
commitment is the problem of involuntary commitment of patients in
overly restrictive hospitalization. Despite some state preference for
public).
Eastman, supra note 38, at 343.
4 David B. Wexler, The Role of Counsel in the Commitment Process, in LAW As
AGENT, supra note 6, at 317.
41 Eastman, supra note 38, at 346.
42 See Eric Turkheimer & Charles D.H. Parry, Why the Gap? Practice and Policy
in Civil Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646, 649 (1992).
4 See supra note 19.
4 See Conservatorship of Murphy v. Murphy, 184 Cal. Rptr. 363, 365 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (reversing trial court's reestablishment of a conservatorship because no
evidence was introduced on the issue of whether Murphy was "gravely disabled" at
present. Evidence had been introduced showing that he could provide food, clothing,
and shelter for himself. Despite this evidence, the trial court made its finding on the
basis that, if released, Murphy might become gravely disabled again sometime in the
future.); see also Conservatorship of Benvenuto v. Benvenuto, 226 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing trial court establishing conservatorship on the basis
testimony purporting that although appellant was not gravely disabled, if released, he
might stop taking his medication and not be able to provide for himself).
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treatment in the least restrictive setting,45 the "players" continue to
pretextually order commitment in maximum security facilities. For
example, courts have committed and transferred patients to maximum
security facilities in spite of expert testimony and evidence that such
facilities are not therapeutic and are inappropriate for the patient."
Pretextual treatment is also a result of decisions made by
attorneys on both sides of the commitment process. Professor David
Wexler suggests that an example of pretextual advocacy by counsel
includes inappropriate confinement.47 This occurs when counsel for
the state automatically assumes an adversarial role at release hearings
advocating needless or inappropriate confinement.48  In his
discussion, Wexler cites several prime examples to illustrate this
point, including the California case of People v. Hurt.49 In Hurt, a
criminal defendant was acquitted of charges of aggravated assault by
reason of insanity. Although the court felt that Hurt could be treated
on an outpatient basis, it nevertheless felt compelled to order him
committed to a state institution for the statutorily mandated ninety
days. Hurt appealed the order arguing that the trial court was not
mandated to adhere to the ninety day requirement and pointing out
that he had remained safely in the community throughout most of the
time prior to and during his trial.5" The state automatically took an
adversarial position and justified its position on the basis of public
safety and the court agreed.5"
4S Mental Health Ass'n in Cal. v. Deukmejian, 233 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that although there is no constitutional right, the California legislature
has established a preference for treatment in the least restrictive environment).
6See Doe v. Gaughan, 808 F.2d 871, 878-80 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that a
state has a legitimate interest in confining violent mentally ill persons in a maximum
security facility and in preventing harm to others and because such facilities are better
suited to handle such persons); State v. Thomas, No.92CA32, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3939, at *46 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 1993).
4 David B. Wexler, Inappropriate Patient Confinement and Appropriate State
Advocacy, in LAW As AGENT, supra note 6, at 347.
Id.
" 153 Cal. Rptr. 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
'o Id. at 756-57.
SI Id. at 757.
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Defense counsel also contributes to pretextual decision making
in the commitment process through pretextual advocacy.5 2 This
occurs when defense attorneys and advocates do not zealously
advocate their client's expressed interest, reasoning pretextually that
the client's expressed wishes are not in the client's best interest."
The problem is also illustrated by attorneys and advocates who try to
avoid representing their clients altogether.' The reasons for this
pretextual advocacy include the fear that attorneys and advocates have
of their own clients as well as the fear of being blamed for releasing
a patient who they feel is sick or who will not get adequate care if
released.5
Pretextual decision making is particularly harmful when it is
made by the patient's own attorney or advocate. The effects of
pretextuality are so pronounced in these situations because the client's
due process rights are violated, the hearings are unfair, and can
potentially have antitherapeutic effects on the patient.
5 6
52 Perlin, supra note 3, at 404-05.
5 See Conservatorship of Roulet v. Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1979) ("Some
appointed counsel, regardless of how experienced they may be, tend to play a
paternalistic rather than an advocacy role in commitment proceedings."); see also
Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 42, at 649 (evidence shows that attorneys at civil
commitment hearings are afraid of being labelled "socially irresponsible" if they
zealously advocate for the release of the mentally disabled from involuntarily civil
commitment).
I See In re Brazelton, 604 N.E.2d 376, 376-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (Appointed
defense counsel in an appeal of an involuntary commitment order sought leave to
withdraw as counsel. The motion was based on the conclusion that counsel made that
the appeal was nonmeritorious and frivolous. The court of appeals denied the motion
because the attorney failed to present any issues which could be raised to support his
client or any potential arguments that could be made, and because the attorney did not
know the burden of proof to be used at trial. The attorney thought that the burden on
the state was preponderance of the evidence when in fact it was clear and convincing
evidence.).
11 Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 42, at 650 ("Mhe institutional structure of
commitment hearings serves to discourage adversarial behavior on the part of the
attorneys."); see Eastman, supra note 38, at 347 (discussing the need for an adversarial
process at commitment hearings).
' Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical
Framework, in LAW AS AoENT, supra note 6, at 309, 323 (stressing the importance of
the appearance of fairness at commitment hearings for this effects the integrity of the
entire commitment review process).
81519931
816 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X
Involuntary commitment is pretextual, when initiated
primarily as a result of unfounded fear of the mentally disabled.
Emotions, particularly fear, can have a significant impact on
involuntary civil commitment decisions. When these feelings are the
primary factor in the commitment process, these decisions are
pretextual and antitherapeutic.
B. Psychotropic Medication
Used in conjunction with involuntary civil commitment,
psychiatric medication is a significant means of treating those with
mental disabilities. While these drugs can alleviate some severe
symptoms and enable the mentally ill to live better lives, 7 it is also
well known that antipsychotic medications often have serious and
debilitating side effects which can be permanent and irreversible."8
These conditions include: tardive dyskensia,"9 dystonia, ° Parkinson's
Syndrome,6 akathisia,62 akinesia,63 perioral tremor," and "disuses
s7 Anne Hull, The Mentally Ill's Right to Refuse Drug Treatment: A Panacea or a
Bitter Pill to Swallow, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 62, 66 (1989-90).
' Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy' and the "Right to Rot" Collide:
The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. Rnv. 447, 452
(1990).
-" Peter R. Breggin, Brain Damage, Dementia, and Persistent Cognition Dysfunction
Associated With Neuroleptic Drugs: Evidence, Etiology, Implications, 11 J. MIND &
BBHAv. 425, 427 (1990). Tardive Dyskensia is a disease associated with neuroleptics
and causes involuntary and abnormal movements in the face as well as effecting other
body parts including the hands, feet, lungs, and diaphram. Id.
' Mary C. McCarron, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding the
Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REV.
477, 482 n.31 (1990) "Dystonia refers to 'bizarre muscle spasms, primarily in the head
and neck. .. interfering with speech and swallowing, [causing] convulsive movements
of the arms and head, bizarre gaits, and difficulty in walking.'" Id. (citing Elizabeth
Symonds, Mental Patient's Rights to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 701,707 n.37 (1980)).
6 Breggin, supra note 59, at 443. Parkinson's Syndrome affects motor control and
is often accompanied by loss of mental faculties, blunting of emotional responsiveness,
and dementia. Id.
62 See Hull, supra note 57, at 67. Akathisia is characterized by restlessness with a
lack of any physical symptoms. Id.
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supersensitivity" or withdrawal-emergent dyskensia. 61 There are also
a number of other side effects.66 Pretextual use of these drugs can
have devastating effects on the patient.
Pretextual treatment with psychiatric medication is carried out
in a number of different ways. For example, medication is often
given for control purposes rather than for genuine therapeutic
reasons.6 7 In litigation concerning the right to refuse medication, the
pretextual use of medication has been regularly conceded by mental
health administrators and clinicians.68 The potential for this type of
abuse was recognized by Justice Stevens in his separate opinion in
Washington v. Harper.' In Harper, the Supreme Court recognized
a substantive liberty interest in freedom from forced medication.7"
The Court held that forcibly medicating a prisoner with antipsychotic
medication does not violate substantive due process when the inmate
is dangerous to himself, others, or to property, and the treatment is
in the inmate's medical interest.7 t The majority concluded that
medication decisions need not be made by an independent third
party.72 Justice Stevens expressed the concern that failure to have
medication decisions made by an independent party could lead to the
' Id. Akinesia develops as a result neuroleptic medication, decreases spontaneity
and causes very slow movement. Id.
6 Blackburn, supra note 58, at 509. Perioral tremor is marked by peculiar
movements in the mouth area sometimes called "rabbit syndrome." Id.
Id. Disuse supersensitivity or withdrawal-emergent dyskinesia is recognized by
abnormal muscle movements, sometimes resembling the movements associated with
tardive dyskinesia. Id.
' Id. at 510. These effects include Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome which
resembles a very severe form of Parkinson's disease and behavioral side effects which
are characterized by "sudden and dramatic exacerbations of psychoses." Id.
67 McCarron, supra note 60, at 484.
' See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified and remanded,
653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. N.J. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119. Evidence
presented at trial included an admission by medical director of defendant hospital that
the hospital "use[d] medication as a form of control and as a substitute for treatment."
Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1299.
69 494 U.S. 210, 242-43 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
7' Id. at 229 (Kennedy, J.).
" Id. at 236.
72 Id. at 231.
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use of medication for control instead of for treatment of the
individual."
Involuntary medication is also utilized as a means of
convenience.74 Despite acknowledged antitherapeutic side effects of
inappropriately administered antipsychotic drugs, courts continue to
allow the use of these drugs in order to make managing mentally ill
patients easier.75
Psychiatric medication is also given for punitive purposes
under the guise of treatment.76  Neuroleptics are sometimes
administered as a means of punishment when the patient will not
behave in a manner which is acceptable to society. For example,
when a patient becomes angry and even violent out of frustration,
73 Id. at 245-46, 250-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But see
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992). Riggins raised the insanity defense at his
trial for murder and robbery. While in custody, he began having trouble sleeping and
began hearing voices. As a result, the psychiatrist at the jail gave him Mellaril, an
antipsychotic medication, to alleviate the symptoms. After being found competent to
stand trial, Riggins sought to have the medication suspended until after the trial. The
motion was denied and Riggins was tried, convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal,
Riggins argued that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because
the forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial denied his right to a
fair trial. Id. at 1812-14. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the conviction, Riggins
v. Nevada, 808 P.2d 535 (Nev. 1991), but was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.
The Court held that the forced administration of antipsychotic medication to
a criminal defendant raising the insanity defense violated his due process rights to a full
and fair trial as he was denied the opportunity to present his true mental state to the jury.
Riggins, 112 S.Ct. at 1816. However, the Court stated that if the county court had
found that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate after
considering less intrusive treatment essential for the defendant's own safety or the safety
of others, the administration of Mellaril would have been acceptable. Id. at 1815. The
Court also said that forcible medication would have been appropriate if the State could
establish that the medication was medically appropriate and that it could not obtain an
adjudication of guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means. Id. (citing Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
I' See Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 318
n.19 (Mass. 1983) ("[Mhe temptation to engage in blanket prescription of such drugs to
maintain order and compensate for such personnel shortages may be irresistible.").
11 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 927 (N.D. Ohio 1980). See People v.
Woodall, 257 Cal. Rptr. 601, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that involuntary
medication may be administered to prisoners if they are a danger to others or to
themselves).
I McCarron, supra note 60, at 484.
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rather than as a result of illness, the patient is sometimes punished by
the forcible administration of medication on the pretext that the
medication is needed to control the patient's temper due to the
medical condition.77
Before we decide to forcibly medicate the mentally disabled
with psychotropic drugs, it is important to assess the reasons why we
are making this choice. We must ask ourselves how much of this
decision is a result of evidence pointing to the patient's lack of
capacity as opposed to our apprehension towards the mentally ill and
our need to make them seem as normal as possible. If, in balancing
these influences, we find that the weight falls in favor of our own
fears, we must reassess our decisions.
IV. The Interplay Between Fear, Pretextuality, and the
Therapeutic Jurisprudence of Treatment
Understanding the interplay between pretextuality, our fear of
the mentally ill, and the treatment we provide to them is an essential
element of assessing the therapeutic jurisprudence value of different
aspects of treatment. It is significant because it helps to explain why
we choose certain treatments over others and whether those choices
are in fact appropriate.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a relatively new approach to
studying law, whereby legal scholars look at the law as a therapeutic
agent.7 Specifically, this approach to mental disability law looks at
how and whether the laws, procedures, and roles of the "players"
have therapeutic, antitherapeutic, or atherapeutic effects on
individuals with mental disabilities.79 In cases where persons are
involuntarily committed and medicated for largely pretextual reasons,
it is important to look specifically at how these pretextual decisions
" Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 926 (citing Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in its 20th
Year, 181 SCIENCE 124, 125 (1973)).
1 See 1 PERLIN, supra note 15, §1.05A (Supp. 1992) (discussing the recent insights
of therapeutic jurisprudence in assessing "the ultimate impact of case law and legislation
affecting mentally disabled individuals.").
" David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIc
JuRISPRUDENCE at ix (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds. 1991) [hereinafter
ESSAYS].
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are having antitherapeutic effects on the mental health consumers.
This is significant for at least two reasons. First, therapeutic
jurisprudence can be used as a research tool to help us understand our
approach to mental disability law and how we can make positive
changes in this area.8 ° Second, it allows us to focus on these specific
changes in the legal system as well as legal and judicial roles.81
The way we act and react to particular people and specific
situations is, to a great extent, a result of our apprehensions in these
situations. Treatment decisions regarding the mentally ill are
influenced by feelings of fear and thus, effect and often impede the
therapeutic value of treatment. The previous section of this article
discussed the manifestations of pretextual treatment as a response to
fear of mental illness and those who suffer from mental illness.8 2
This section examines how pretextual treatment can be antitherapeutic
in both the commitment and medication contexts.
A therapeutic jurisprudence assessment of the value of
different forms of pretextual treatment given to the mentally ill
indicates that at least some of the treatment provided is in fact
dictated by our fears rather than exclusively by the patients' needs or
wants.83 Thus, some of the ordered treatment may be needless or
actually be harmful and thus antitherapeutic. Obviously, this thwarts
any good faith efforts to provide treatment.
Needless commitment, for example, has a number of
antitherapeutic effects. One such effect is that a patient who is
needlessly or excessively institutionalized is susceptible to becoming
iatrogenic." This condition can be caused by excessively long
o See generally David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as
a New Research Tool, in ESSAYS, supra note 79, at 303 (suggesting how to construct a
therapeutic jurisprudence research agenda and various novel research avenues).
t See David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW AS
AGENT, supra note 6, at 20.
8 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Karolyn Siegal & Peter Tuckel, Suicide and Civil Commitment, 12 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 343, 349 (1987).
" Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the
Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 777, 850 n.290
(1981/82) (citing Arthur Cohen's statement at hearings on the constitutional rights of the
mentally ill before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee
of the Judiciary 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sessions, 210 (1970)). Cohen stated, "Any kind
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treatments whereby the individual becomes dependent upon the
treatment and cannot exist without it.85 Thus, the condition becomes
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Another effect of needless and extended treatment is that the
patient is likely to fall into the "revolving door" syndrome. This
involves situations where a patient goes in and out of psychiatric
hospitals as a result of the initial involuntary treatment.8 6 Mary L.
Durham and John Q. LaFond explain this syndrome as a result of the
government forcing commitment on the mentally ill "for the
ostensible purpose of providing needed treatment. "87 Therefore this
treatment is not only needless, but also antitherapeutic because it
makes the mentally ill unable to live in society and causes frequent
returns to mental institutions."
Excessive commitment is also antitherapeutic because it
attaches an additional stigma to the patient.89 This stigma inhibits
treatment because it often causes the patient to have a low self-
image. 9° In particular, the stigma is felt by the mentally ill patient
when trying to move from institutional life to the community. This
is especially true when the mentally disabled attempt to secure
employment, insurance, housing, and other necessary components of
living in the community. Thus it is more difficult for the mentally
disabled to live and remain in the community.9"
of forcible detention of a person in alien environment may seriously affect him in the
first few days of detention, leading to all sorts of acute traumatic and iatrogenic
symptoms." Id.
's See Durham & LaFond, Missing Premise, supra note 12, at 157.
See Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, No. 91-SC189, 1992 WL 77908, at *5 (Col. Sup. Ct.
April 20, 1992).
'" Durham & LaFond, Impact, supra note 12, at 123. See LAFOND & DURHAM,
supra note 4, at 163 (describing "revolving door" syndrome resulting from forced
commitment).
8 Id.
" See Conservatorship of Roulet v. Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979) ("Mhe
individual's hospital and post-hospitalization experience may cause him to lose self-
confidence and self-esteem.").
9 Id.
11 Siegal & Tuckel, supra note 83, at 353. See Roulet, 590 P.2d at 7 (citing
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190,
1200-1201 (1974) ("The former mental patient is likely to be treated with distrust and
even loathing; he may be socially ostracized and victimized by employment and
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Another problem of overcommitment is that there is not
always room in appropriate facilities. As a result, patients are placed
in more restrictive facilities or wherever there is a bed that happens
to be available. The appropriate placement has significant effects on
the therapeutic value of an individual's treatment.' If one is
committed to an inappropriate facility, the placement can be
detrimental to the patient's potential improvement and can make the
patient's condition worse. 93
Another antitherapeutic effect of commitment is the increased
potential for patients to commit or attempt suicide as a result of the
despair felt from being confined to a secured facility.' Studies have
demonstrated that institutionalization can encourage suicidal
behavior. 9 People who are involuntarily committed, particularly
those who are suicidal, are often placed in seclusion for their own
safety." However, this treatment often results in a higher rate of
suicide, 97 as patients fear isolation and feel a lack control over their
lives.9" As a result of these findings, recommendations have been
made to abandon long term commitments in favor of shorter
commitments."
Forcibly medicating patients with antipsychotic medications
also has antitherapeutic effects on the patient, particularly when such
treatment is pretextual. While psychiatric medication does have
educational discrimination.")); In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Cal. 1977); People
v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 362 (Cal. 1975).
' See State v. Gladding, No. 9-281, 1983 WL 6009, at *2 (Ohio App. Dec. 9,
1983) (requiring a mental patient to stay in a maximum security hospital for treatment
of his serious psychotic condition).
" See Doe v. Gaughan, 808 F. 2d 871, 879 (1st Cir. 1986) (describing punishment
of persons awaiting involuntary commitment proceedings as inappropriate because it does
not bear any relation to the purpose for which they were confined).
" Siegal & Tuckel, supra note 83, at 349.
9Id.
"s See id. at 349 (citing study describing seclusion as one of the traditional suicide
precautions used in a therapeutic setting).
' See id. at 350 (discussing study showing that 52 percent of the patients who
committed suicide were in isolation).
"See id. (citing investigative conclusions and evidence linking a high rate of suicide
in patients with enforced seclusion, and the feelings of fear and loss of control it
engenders).
"Siegal & Tuckel, supra note 83, at 355-56.
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beneficial effects, 1° it can also have severe antitherapeutic side
effects, which can outweigh the benefits of such medication. 01 The
fact that the medication has both positive and negative effects makes
it harder to detect pretextuality, particularly when the treatment is not
entirely inappropriate.
In addition to the severe side effects of psychotropic drugs,
other antitherapeutic effects of pretextual medication include neglect
and abuse in the administration of drugs. For example, medication
can be given for improper reasons such as punishing patients or
maintaining control over the hospital ward, as previously discussed." °
Forcible medication can also be antitherapeutic when psychotropic
drugs are freely prescribed without any regard for the patient's actual
medication needs."0 3
Psychiatric medication, even when given in a good faith effort
to treat an individual, can be anti-therapeutic in instances where there
is a misdiagnosis of the patient's condition and his need for
medication. 4 Medication can also inhibit treatment when hospital
staff fail to monitor these patients for adverse reactions to drugs. 0 5
The ultimate antitherapeutic effect of pretextual treatment,
both in the form of involuntarily civil commitment and forcible
medication, is that the patient suffers from the effects of the
inappropriate treatment. Thus, pretextual and inappropriate treatment
defeats this purpose and the patient's condition is likely to deteriorate
rather than improve.
to McCarron, supra note 60, at 481-82.
to, Id. at 482.
1o Supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
11 See Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 926-27.
104 McCarron, supra note 60, at 483-84.
"e Della M.J. Ledwith, Jones v. Gerhardstein: The Involuntarily Committed Mental
Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment With Antipsychotic Drugs, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1367,
1373 (1990).
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V. Conclusion
We must all continue to live with ourselves and our fears.
Because there is no way to completely rid ourselves of our anxieties,
we will always shiver at the thought of a dangerous mentally ill
person in our presence. Nevertheless, we can take steps to ensure
that best efforts are made towards ensuring therapeutic, rather than
antitherapeutic jurisprudence. We can do this by stepping back from
our treatment choices and assessing why we are making them. We
must ask ourselves whether the treatment decision we have made is
really for the patient or merely to relieve the anxieties the mentally
ill provoke in us. This can be done specifically by looking at the
evidence presented as to whether or not a person should be
involuntarily committed or medicated, and examining whether a
component of this evidence is our fear of the mentally ill; then we
must examine to what extent these emotions sway our decision-
making. Ultimately, we must stop blaming, punishing, and
victimizing the mentally disabled for their condition because of our
own anxieties.'0o
Even by taking the time to do this, we may not be able to
completely overcome our conscious and unconscious fears and biases
towards the mentally disabled. We will, however, have a better
chance of providing the most therapeutic treatment possible.
'o PORTER, supra note 27, at 24.
